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 I. Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a review and commentary on the current financial and 
economic crisis. It considers important analytical and policy issues from a 
global and North-South perspective. The analytical issues include the reasons 
for the better than expected performance of the world economy following the 
early period of acute crisis, the role of global financial imbalances, and whether 
or not economic theory has been helpful in explaining the causes of the crisis. It 
is argued that close international cooperation and policy coordination are 
essential to continued recovery and improvement in the distribution of the fruits 
of growth.  Cooperation and financial regulation are particularly necessary in 
order to prevent international contagion and cascading sovereign debt defaults.  
 
   2  
It is generally accepted that the acute phase of the current global financial and 
economic crisis began in September 2008, with the demise of Lehman Brothers 
-- a leading US investment bank. Eighteen months later, and in the context of 
the continuing global economic and financial crisis, the following issues require 
careful analysis: 
 Why the world economy has performed so much better than most 
analysts had expected when the crisis began.  
 Which economic theories, if any, have been helpful in explaining the 
course of the crisis to date. 
 To what extent, if any, were regulatory deficits in the field of finance and 
global financial imbalances responsible for the crisis? 
 How should the world’s financial system be organized so as to secure 
maximum sustainable and equitable growth for the real world economy? 
 The question of government debt and of the danger of inflation.  
 Other salient policy issues that have come to the fore, including that of  
the drawing down of sovereign debt. 
 
While the economic significance of the above issues is self-evident, not all can 
be treated satisfactorily in a single paper, hence only a relatively few issues will 
be examined in detail.  
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II. Economic and Financial Crisis and the Global Economy 
 
The causes (both short- and longer-term) of the current global economic and 
financial crisis have been discussed in a number of contributions, including 
Aiginger (2009), Eichengreen and O’Rourke (October 2008), IMF (2008a, 
2009b), IMF (2009a, 2009b, 2009c), IMF (2010a, 2010b), Krugman (2008, 
2009a, 2009b, 2010), Ormerod (2010), Solow (2009), UNCTAD (2008, 2009, 
2010), UNDESA (2008, 2009, 2010), the US Council of Economic Advisers 
(2010). 
 
It is generally agreed that difficulties associated with the housing segment of the 
US house property market were the immediate cause of the crisis (See, for 
example, IMF, 2008a). Complex financial instruments that incorporated sub-
prime house mortgages lost their value as the housing bubble burst following 
ten years of continuous price rises based on expectations of a continuation of 
such increases. This housing bubble occurred despite the fact that during the 
previous two decades the supply of housing had increased appreciably (Solow, 
2009). In brief, house prices had risen because interest rates were low and credit 
was easily available, and prices were expected to continue to increase, much as 
in the case of the classic tulip mania and bubble in the early 17
th
 century when, 
at its peak, the price of a tulip bulb in Holland was equivalent to that of a three-
story town house.  
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Housing bubbles have occurred many times before in American economic 
history without leading to an acute economic and financial crisis, let alone in the 
rest of the world. This episode was different in that it was accompanied by a 
bubble in US share and other asset prices. Moreover, the bursting of the US 
housing bubble led to a fall in share prices not only in the U.S. but also around 
the world. This was due to the much closer integration of world stock markets 
resulting from the financial globalization that had occurred in the previous two 
decades. It is interesting to note that bank losses due to the failure in the sub-
prime mortgages market are estimated to have been around US$ 250 billion. 
The consequent financial crisis led to a sharp fall in aggregate world stock 
market capitalization of the order of US$ 26 trillion in one year – nearly one 
hundred times larger than the losses associated with sub-prime mortgages.
1
  
Robert Solow (2009) notes that the combined result of the housing and the stock 
market shocks was a fall in US household wealth from US$ 64.4 trillion in mid 
2007 (before the crisis) to US$ 51.5 trillion at the end of 2008. Thus 13 trillion 
dollars of household wealth disappeared in the space of about one year. As 
Solow (2009: add page number) rightly observes:  
 
Nothing concrete had changed. “Buildings still stood; factories 
were still capable of functioning; people had not lost their ability to 
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work or their skills or their knowledge of technology. But a 
population that thought in 2007 that they had 64.4 trillion dollars 
with which to plan their lives discovered in 2008 that they have 
lost 20 per cent of that.” 
 
Many economists date the acute phase of the present crisis to the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers USA in September 2008. Whether or not the collapse of this 
important financial institution was the root cause of the crisis, it certainly 
provided the trigger. In a comparison of the crisis of the 1930s and that 
beginning in 2008, Christina Romer, currently Chair of the US Council of 
Economic Advisers, observes “In 2008, the U.S. financial system had similarly 
survived the initial declines in house and stock prices…but the outright failure 
of Lehman Brothers proved too much for the system. As has been described by 
many others, the breakdown in funding relationships in the weeks following 
Lehman’s collapse was almost unfathomable. The financial system truly 
froze…’’ (Romer, 2010: 3). 
 
III. Short- and Long-Term Causes of the Crisis 
In addition to the literature on the failure of the sub-prime mortgage market, 
there is by now a relatively large literature on the other short-term as well as 
                                                                                                                                                        
1
 These numbers illustrate the orders of magnitude involved in the stock market contagion at that time. In fact in 
the first six months share prices fell sharply and then rose slowly over the next six months.   
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long-term ‘causes’ of the current economic and financial crisis, referred to 
above. It is too near the events to expect a consensus to emerge on the causes of 
the crisis except perhaps on the observation that it had multiple causes. The 
diverse contributions on this topic have been succinctly and most helpfully 
summarized by Aiginger (2009, Table 1). For reasons of space only some of the 
causes listed in Table 1 are discussed in the following sections.  
 
III.1. Deficits in Regulation 
It is widely agreed that a major long-term factor in the making of the crisis was 
the lack of government regulation, both national and international, of financial 
institutions in the US and worldwide.  In turn, this regulatory deficit appears to 
have arisen from an ideological faith in the virtues of the free market. It was 
believed not only that the market was always efficient but that it was also self-
correcting (See further Ormerod, 2010).   
 
Alan Greenspan, the former Chairman of the US Federal Reserve (Head of the 
Central Banking System and the Chief regulator of U.S. monetary policy) in a 
speech given in April 2005 outlined how innovation had brought about a 
multitude of new products, speaking approvingly of how such “improvements 
have led to a rapid growth in sub-prime mortgage lending.” (Greenspan, 2005.) 
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The New York Times, reporting on Greenspan’s evidence before a 2008 US 
Congressional Committee, wrote “ … Mr. Greenspan conceded error on 
regulation, stating that he had “put too much faith in the self-correcting powers 
of free markets ….refused to accept blame for the crisis  but acknowledged that 
his belief in deregulation had been shaken.” (Andrews, 2008).  
 
In testifying before the 2010 U.S. Congress Financial Crisis Inquiry Committee 
(established to investigate the sub-prime mortgage crisis) Greenspan defended 
himself against the dual charge that he was responsible for the housing bubble 
due to his low interest rate policy and for not puncturing the bubble before it 
reached a level that would cause serious systemic difficulties.  Greenspan 
suggested that his critics had short memories as many of them had earlier 
applauded sub-prime mortgages as being of tremendous benefit to low-income 
Americans.  Furthermore, he suggested that at the time many people would have 
questioned whether there was indeed a housing bubble and asked how, in any 
case, the Federal Reserve would know the answer to this question better than 
the market. He also told the committee that regulators were helpless to stop the 
economic meltdown and the sub-prime mortgage crisis (Greenspan, 2010). 
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The net result of this mindset was the evolution of a largely unregulated parallel 
banking system performing the functions of banks but without being subject to 
banking regulations (Krugman, 2008).  
DELETE the following unfinished sentence:  
However, a more recent testimony before the US Congress, Alan 
Greenspan (Greenspan 2010) has     
 
Robust responses to Greenspan’s arguments have been made by James 
Galbraith (2010), Paul Krugman (2010) and Robert Solow (2009), among 
others.  They suggest that the securitization of sub-prime mortgages through 
their marketing as a combined financial product was little understood by the 
market.  This, together with complex credit default swaps, as well as several 
other financial innovations, should be regarded as fraudulent practice that 
should have been tightly regulated.  Krugman (2010) suggests that, had the 
wide-ranging reforms currently under discussion in the US Congress been in 
place earlier, “a handful of lavishly-paid leaders of the financial industry would 
not have been able to mislead and exploit consumers and investors.” 
  
III.2  World Financial Imbalances 
Apart from the above question of regulatory deficits with respect to the 
functioning of financial markets, many economists believe that the huge global 
imbalances in the current accounts of nation states contribute to financial 
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fragility and crisis. The latter arises because deficits that cannot be financed 
could result in disorderly and unwanted currency depreciations. Fear of such 
events may lead to widespread turbulence in financial markets and national 
economies.   
 
In 2004, the US current account deficit amounted to US$ 666 billion dollars, 
comprising 69 per cent of the total deficit of countries running negative current 
account balances that year (Table 2).  This compares with a current account 
deficit of US$ 413.5 in 2000, which accounted for 62.2 per cent of total deficits.  
In the last quarter of 2005 (using a figure not in Table 2) the US deficit was 
estimated to be around US$700 billion dollars, or 7 per cent of US GDP.  Thus 
before the crisis, an already high US deficit was getting bigger, which, on the 
face of it, was not a healthy development.  Nevertheless, an essential point is 
that the markets seemed then to have accepted the situation as indicated by the 
relative stability of exchange rates of the main currencies (See Cooper, 2005 
and Summers, 2006).
2
  (See below for further discussion on exchange rate 
stability.)  
 
An RIS (Research and Information System for Developing Countries) 2008 
policy brief provides a stark outline of the evolution of the US international and 
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national financial situation, as follows. In the period 1970-91, the cumulative 
current account deficit of the US was US$ 881.5 billion, increasing to US$ 
1,569.3 billion during 1992-2000 and in the period 2001-2006 it reached US$ 
3,572.5 billion, with a deficit of US$ 811.5 billion in 2006 alone. In recent 
years, China’s foreign exchange surpluses have financed the growing US 
current account deficits at low interest rates.
3
  
 
It is important to note, however, that China is not the main, let alone the only, 
economy to run a large current account surplus. In 2004, before the global 
financial and economic crisis, China’s current account surplus of US$ 70 billion 
accounted for less than 8 per cent of the total surpluses of countries with a 
positive current account balance (Table 2).  Table 2 also suggests that in 2004 
China’s surplus was considerably smaller than that of either Germany or Japan, 
particularly the latter.   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
2
Another related manifestation of global imbalances before the crisis was the huge and growing foreign currency 
reserves of the Chinese Central Bank.  In the second quarter of 2010 the total value of these reserves was 
estimated to be around 2.4 trillion US dollars (Chin, 2010).  
3
 There is a “blame-game” with respect to who bears responsibility for the current large imbalances -- the 
profligate US consumer causing the country’s current account deficit, or the Asian peoples’ high propensity to 
save, resulting in current account surpluses.  Such a construction of events can be interpreted negatively as 
suggesting that the US attracts savings from the world’s poorer nations thereby depriving the latter of much-
needed capital.  However, Larry Summers (2005) suggested that such arguments are based on presumptions that 
do not tally with the broader facts.  Specifically, he observed that during the last decade the world has been 
awash with savings and liquidity.  Had the US been extracting savings from the rest of the world at the expense 
of investment elsewhere, the likely result would have been rising global real interest rates rather than the low 
rates actually experienced. 
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Other RIS data also indicates that the US has been living “beyond its means” 
both at the household and government levels, stretching their respective budget 
constraints. Household savings that had been about 10 per cent of GDP in 1980 
and 7 per cent in 1990 were only 0.4 per cent in 2007.  The Federal budget, 
which had a surplus of US$ 236.2 billion in 2000, recorded a deficit of US$ 400 
billion in the 2008 financial year. Mortgage debt ballooned from US$ 3.8 
trillion in 1980 to US$ 14.4 trillion in the third quarter of 2007 and consumer 
credit increased from US$ 0.35 trillion in 1980 to US$ 2.5 trillion in 2007.  By 
financing the recurring current account deficits through borrowing from abroad, 
the US became a net debtor to the outside world, with the net investment 
position showing a negative balance of US$ 2.5 trillion in 2006. 
 
The US has been both living beyond its means yet growing faster than other 
advanced industrial countries such as Germany and Japan who are living within 
their means. Paradoxically, therefore, the international financial system appears 
to favour profligacy rather than thrift. Further, capital has been flowing from 
developing to developed countries (from China to the US, for example), that is, 
in a direction contrary to that which might be deemed appropriate from a 
development perspective. 
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Even those who do not regard global imbalances (particularly those of China 
and the US) to be the root cause of the crisis acknowledge that re-balancing is 
required, principally involving the elimination of high long-term deficits (as in 
the US) and persistent high surpluses (as in China). In policy terms this means 
achieving a zero current account deficit at the rate of growth of GDP that 
would achieve full employment. 
 
In the case of the US, over the four-year period 2007-2010, the current account 
deficit declined from 5.2 per cent of GDP in 2007 to 2.2 per cent in 2010 (IMF, 
2009a and 2009b). This reduction was the result of the compression of 
economic activity during the recession and the deficit may well grow again as 
economic growth resumes. 
 
China’s surplus, on the other hand, has remained more or less constant over the 
four-year period 2007-2010, amounting to 11 per cent of GDP in 2007 and an 
average of 8 per cent over the next three years (UNDESA, 2010). Its optimal 
surplus would be that which corresponded to the full employment level of the 
economy and desired growth of real wages. In both the case of the US and 
China, this rebalancing may require considerable change in economic structure: 
in the former a greater emphasis on exports and a lower level of 
consumption and imports; in the latter, a lower level of exports and higher 
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domestic consumption of both imports and domestic goods. Such 
rebalancing is likely to affect all countries, whether or not they have contributed 
significantly to the global imbalances.  
 
In order to achieve wider rebalancing of the world economy it is also 
necessary to consider the cases of Japan and Germany as these are also 
long-term surplus countries  (Akyuz, 2010).  
 
Apart from the trade and current account imbalances, there is another major 
imbalance in the global economy that requires urgent resolution. This concerns 
the distribution of both personal and functional income and their implications 
for aggregate consumption and aggregate demand. Under globalization, the 
power of workers in most advanced countries has been sharply reduced while 
that of capital has increased due largely to the free movement of capital. As a 
consequence, real wage growth has been lower than productivity growth. This 
process threatens to result in global under-consumption which, other things 
being equal, will reduce both growth and employment.    
 
To conclude, there is a need to redress imbalances between consumption and 
investment in major economies. However, it must be noted that, despite a 
longstanding and growing US current account deficit, there has been no crisis 
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in the sense of a disorderly devaluation of the dollar. This leads some to 
reject the notion of financial imbalances as being a major cause of the crisis, 
pointing to the fact that there was no run on the dollar. Opponents of this view 
suggest that the crisis that emerged in 2008 was due to uncontrolled US deficits. 
They further allege that the US took advantage of the US dollar being the 
world’s only reserve currency such that its current account deficits went 
unchecked.  
 
IV.  Why Has The World Economy Performed Better Than Expected? 
 
Christina Romer (Romer 2009) argues that the shocks that hit the US economy 
in the autumn of 2008 were at least as large as those experienced in 1929. A 
salient shock in both crises was the fall in household wealth: this fell by 17 per 
cent between December 2007 and December 2008 in the US. This was more 
than five times the decrease in 1929. 
 
An important negative feature of the current crisis compared with that of the 
1930s is the role and nature of banks and the collapse of inter-bank relations and 
that of trade credit for big and small businesses. Banks have refused to lend to 
other banks or to non-bank financial institutions. Similarly asset price volatility 
in the US has been greater in the current crisis than in the past, and there is 
evidence that this is so in other advanced countries. A great deal of research 
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indicates that such volatility has an adverse effect on the level of investment. 
Notwithstanding these negative factors, the actual outcomes during the current 
crisis have fortunately been more benign so far. 
 
During the Great Depression, starting in the late 1920s, the peak-to-trough 
decline in GDP in the major economies averaged nearly 12 per cent, ranging 
from 30 per cent in the US and Canada to somewhat under 10 per cent in Japan, 
Italy and Britain. The depressed state of the economy continued until the 
beginning of the Second World War (Llewellyn, 2008). 
 
In the current downturn, falls in GDP in the US, Europe and the world economy 
have been of a much lower order. Although the numbers of unemployed, 
underemployed and discouraged workers have increased during the current 
crisis, the rise has been far less than during the 1930s depression. Further, there 
are signs that it is unlikely to amount to more than 10 per cent of the labour 
force, and there is evidence that it is decreasing.
4
   
 
In 2009, for the first time in 50 years, world GDP shrank, but only by two per 
cent, and was expected to return to positive growth in 2010 (UNDESA, 2009). 
Whether or not this growth is sustained and leads to resumption of the previous 
                                                 
4
 The only OECD country to reach the unemployment level experienced by the US in the 1930s is Spain, with a 
current unemployment rate of 19 per cent (Economist, Economic and Financial Indicators, May 1, 2010).   
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growth path is as yet an open question.  The answer will depend on a number 
of factors including the debt and solvency crises in Greece, Spain, and Ireland. 
Although the decline in GDP for individual advanced countries has been 
greater than that for the world as a whole, none of these have reached the 
proportions of the 1930s depression. The maximum reduction in GDP growth in 
2009 in individual advanced countries has ranged between two per cent and six 
per cent.  Furthermore, IMF data and projections indicate that most countries 
will have positive growth in 2010 (IMF, 2009c.). 
 
What explains the seeming ability of the world economy to avert a depression 
as serious as that in the 1930s?  Evidence and analysis suggest three main 
reasons. The first is the outstanding record of India, China and other emerging 
countries both before and during the crisis. As Wolf (2008) suggests: “emerging 
economies had been an engine of growth for the past five years. China 
accounted for a quarter, Brazil Russia and India for another quarter, and all 
emerging and developing countries together for about two thirds. World growth 
is measured here in PPP exchange rates.”  Despite the crisis these countries, 
particularly India and China, have been able to continue on their fast long-term 
growth path.  They may therefore be expected to remain a long-term positive 
factor in the evolution of the world economy: fast growth in these countries 
helps the US and other economies by maintaining high levels of world demand.  
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The second major factor explaining the relatively good performance of the 
world economy during the present downturn has been the unexpected and 
welcome degree of cooperation between countries, symbolized by their 
adoption of coordinated global measures through the creation of the G20. This 
grouping includes all leading advanced countries and a number of emerging 
nations that together constitute about 85 per cent of world production and 
about two thirds of world population. In 2009 the G20 agreed to a huge 
international stimulus even when many of them already had fiscal deficits. It 
was also agreed to cut interest rates and to strengthen the IMF and World Bank 
in order to help developing countries. This high degree of cooperation stands in 
striking contrast to the lack of cooperation and beggar-thy-neighbour policies 
that characterized nation states’ behaviour in the 1930s.5   
 
As mentioned above, a significant feature of the response to the current crisis 
has been an aggregate coordinated fiscal stimulus amounting in 2008-2009 to an 
enormous 2.6 billion US dollars, equivalent to 3.4 per cent of world GDP
6
. (See 
Table 3). As a proportion of their GDP, developing countries in general have 
had a greater stimulus than developed countries.  
 
                                                 
5
 However, it can be argued that the G20 is far from an ideal vehicle for international cooperation as it excludes 
more than 150 countries.  Nevertheless, some argue that a group bigger than the G20 may not be a practical 
device for agreeing and implementing decisive measures to cope with the crisis.  
6
 The source of these figures is UNDESA (2010, Table 4, page 20.). 
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There is evidence that the stimulus has been successful in the sense that, in 
general, the greater the stimulus received, the greater was countries’ economic 
growth (US Council of Economic Advisers, 2010). Nevertheless, alongside this 
positive effect of the stimulus, the stimulus created fiscal difficulties for 
governments, leading to calls for the stimulus to be withdrawn or diminished in 
size. This would, however, be a serious mistake as a premature withdrawal of 
the stimulus when the world economy has not yet achieved reasonable 
economic growth (let alone reverted to its long-term growth rate) may push 
economies further into recession or even into full-scale depression if there are 
negative effects on expectations. It is therefore all the more important that the 
cooperation achieved so far in the G20 arrangement should continue and 
improve so that there is a coordinated and well organized withdrawal of the 
fiscal stimulus at the appropriate time. The US experience between 1937 and 
1940 (Romer, 2009) and that of Japan more recently should be a warning to 
present-day policymakers in this respect.  
 
The third positive factor that has also helped improve the performance of world 
economy in relation to the present crisis can be described as an issue of 
governance. It so happened that economic leadership in the US in this period of 
crisis was held by an intellectually and politically close group of economists.  
These were conventional US Keynesian economists (in contrast to Cambridge 
Keynesians) who defined the essential problem facing the world economy as 
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being that of a shortage of aggregate demand. Unlike the Chicago economists, 
they believed that government induced stimuli could correct the demand deficits 
and thereby help the real economy.
7
  The cohesive economic outlook of this 
team of economic advisors helped ensure clarity and purpose in the stimulus 
programme and its implementation.   
 
Not only were these economists well-versed in economic theory, but also, if not 
more importantly, some of them, including Ben Bernanke (Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve) and Christina Romer (Chair, US Council of Economic 
Advisers), were serious students of the history of the Great Depression and were 
determined not to repeat the serious policy mistakes made during that period.   
 
To sum up, three factors -- namely continuing fast growth in India, China and 
other developing countries, unprecedented cooperation between countries 
symbolized by the G20 (see further, below) and the creation and governance by 
like-minded people of a corrective economic policy programme -- have been 
positive factors in the recent evolution of the world economy. Hopefully, these 
                                                 
7
 Most “American Keynesian” economists, following Paul Samuelson, believe in “the Grand Synthesis”, that is, 
that suitable monetary and fiscal policy can restore and maintain full employment and that, in a fully employed 
economy, neoclassical economics comes into its own. In contrast, “Cambridge Keynesian” economists reject 
neoclassical economics altogether, but rather believe that monetary and fiscal policy alone will not bring about 
full employment. In their view, only a “planned” economy in the sense that the government takes a major role in 
influencing investment decisions (that is indicative planning) can lead to continuous full employment. On the 
other hand “Chicago” economists believe in the pre-Keynesian classical model whose central distinguishing 
feature is that is denies the existence of  “involuntary” unemployment in the modern economy. These ideas find 
resonance in modern macro-economics referred to in Section VI. 
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factors will continue to operate in this direction, even if certain other 
developments present obstacles to widespread resumption of reasonable growth 
rates. As will become clear in the following sections, currency volatility, fiscal 
deficits and the premature drawing-down of sovereign debt can have a negative 
impact on the rate of growth.  
 
V.  Financial Globalization and the Real Economy 
The financial system and the conduct of monetary policy prior to the eruption of 
the financial crisis and onset of economic recession in 2008 have received 
thoroughly deserved criticism for allowing the development of the sub-prime 
mortgage bubble, the stock-market bubble and asset prices bubbles and not 
puncturing these in time or minimizing the damage. There were, however, some 
evident benefits, albeit unintended, of this regime for the real economy and 
which have not been adequately recognized (see below). Without a more 
balanced picture of the merits and demerits of the pre-crisis financial system 
and policies, future policy decisions may not be the most appropriate.  
 
Table 4 provides broad-brush data for selected countries and for the real 
economy during the last two decades. What is clear is that the world economy 
performed exceptionally well in real terms during the present decade, achieving 
arguably its highest ever growth rate. Further, between 2000-2007, developing 
countries grew at almost twice the rate of developed countries. This helped to 
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marginally reduce the disparity between the rich and poor countries. Among 
developing countries India and China -- the two most populous countries where 
the bulk of the population hitherto lived in absolute poverty -- had stellar 
performances, experiencing historically unprecedented growth that has resulted 
in substantial poverty reduction.
8
 
 
Among the developed countries, the United States has been the leader in terms 
of real economic growth. Evidence suggests that in the period 1995-2005 it 
achieved a one percentage point increase in its long-term trend rate of growth of 
productivity (Jorgenson and Vu, 2005). This is an impressive achievement 
bearing in mind that this is not a “catch-up” economy but one operating at the 
frontiers of knowledge. Such a productivity increase implies a high degree of 
technical progress as well as concomitant organizational changes. This 
achievement would be considered even greater if the benefits of national 
productivity growth had been spread more widely. 
 
Evidence suggests that the US, India, China and a clutch of other countries -- 
the pre-crisis top performers in terms of growth rates -- were overall 
beneficiaries of international economic integration and financial globalization. 
In the case of India and China, this was partly due to the fact that they managed 
                                                 
8
 There is scholarly dispute over the Indian figures for poverty reduction. However, the Indian government’s 
view and that of many scholars is that gains in poverty reduction from fast growth have been significant. See 
further Planning Commission of India (2009).  
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their integration into the global economy so as to avoid the harmful effects of 
unfettered capital flows in particular. They also pursued a policy of “strategic 
integration” in relation to trade and long-term investment (Singh, forthcoming).   
 
Financial globalization enabled China to purchase US treasury bills, thereby 
helping the US to finance its current account deficit and keep US interest rates 
low. In addition, globalization has helped the US to keep domestic inflation in 
check, not least through imports of cheap consumer and intermediate products 
from China. (For a fuller discussion of the economic interactions between the 
US and the Chinese economy, see Singh, 2007.) 
 
Most students of financial systems would agree that the central purpose is to 
allocate society’s savings and investment resources to those households, 
corporations and jurisdictions that can use them most effectively. It could be 
argued that the pre-crisis financial system and monetary policies were 
performing that function, as is evidenced by very fast growth across the world 
economy during the period 2000-2007. However, the implosion resulting from 
dubious policies and unregulated practices highlight inherent flaws in this 
system. These rendered it unsustainable. The best that can be said about the pre-
crisis financial regime is that it demonstrated that the world economy had a 
growth potential of at least 5 per cent a year on the supply side.  
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The purpose of any reform of the financial system should be to allow the world 
economy to grow at its full potential in a sustainable manner. It would be a 
travesty of justice from the perspective of the world’s poor if any reformed 
financial system fell short of the sustainable growth objective.  
 
To sum up, it could be argued that the developing world under the recent global 
regime has taken a giant step forward. A reformed international financial system 
must underpin and further promote this economic progress.  
 
VI. Economic Theory and the Current Crisis 
Economists’ analyses and conclusions relating to one particular crisis are not 
necessarily relevant to another. The analytical lessons derived from the Latin 
American debt crisis of the 1980s do not explain the following crisis that 
erupted in Asia in the 1990s.  Similarly, the lessons of the Asian crisis of the 
1990s do not seem to be applicable to the current financial crisis. 
 
The 1980s debt crisis had a devastating impact on Latin America.  It is widely 
agreed that for the continent as a whole it was a “lost decade” characterized by 
little or no growth and a fall in per capita income of more than 15 per cent over 
the decade.  In contrast, per capita income in East Asian countries grew by more 
than 50 per cent during this period.  There is sharp contention between orthodox 
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and heterodox economists regarding the reasons for the enormous differences in 
the performance of these two regions. Orthodox economists argue that the Latin 
America debt crisis was caused by domestic factors, namely micro-economic 
inefficiencies, macro-economic policy errors, and unwise borrowing and 
spending.  In contrast heterodox economists believe that the Latin American 
debt crisis was due to external factors over which these countries had no 
control. In particular, they emphasize the changes in US monetary policy in the 
late 1970s that resulted in an increase in the real world interest rate from 0.5 per 
cent in the mid 1970s to 7 per cent in the early 1980s -- a fourteen-fold increase 
-- (the so-called “Volcker shock”). The impact on the highly-indebted Latin 
American economies was devastating.  
 
Heterodox economists argue that the restrictive changes in US monetary policy 
had a greater impact on Latin America than Asia. This was partly due to Latin 
Americas’s higher initial level of debt and its structure. In addition, Latin 
America was more affected by adverse changes in the terms-of-trade than was 
Asia.
9
 Further, as Fishlow (1991) points out, Latin America countries, unlike 
Asian countries, were subject to capital supply shocks due to contagion. Taken 
together, as they should be, these shocks were far greater for Latin America 
than for Asia. Hence Latin America countries became more heavily balance-of-
                                                 
9
 For a detailed analysis of the debt crisis of the 1980s see Singh 1993; Ross 1991; Fishlow 1990; Hughes and 
Singh 1991. 
   25  
payments constrained and for a much longer period than did the Asian 
countries. This explains their relatively poor economic performance in the “lost 
decade” (Singh, 1993). Thus it is argued that the budget and current account 
deficits in Latin America were both the cause and consequence of their debt 
crisis.  
 
The 1997-2000 Asian crisis was of a rather different kind than that in Latin 
America. By and large, governments in Asia have had a record of managing 
their macro-economic policies well. It was the private sector’s excessive 
borrowing in foreign currency and the consequent mismatch between expected 
inflows and outflows that led to the Asian crisis. It could be said to have been a 
case of government virtue and private sector profligacy. However, leading US 
officials, including Alan Greenspan, Larry Summers, and the IMF itself, later 
put forward a more ideological explanation for the Asian crisis. They argued 
that, although some micro- or macro -economic disequilibria (such as the 
Bangkok property boom) may have been the trigger for the crisis, the root cause 
was nothing less than the entire “Asian way of doing business”. This was 
characterized by close relationships between government, business and finance 
in the day-to-day micro-economic behaviour of economic agents, what these 
critics termed “crony capitalism”. This is alleged to have resulted in serious 
distortions in the economy and in economic management, leading ultimately to 
the crisis. (See Glen and Singh (2005) for a fuller discussion of these issues.) 
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This version of events is highly disputed by heterodox economists. They argue 
that the root cause of the crisis was the introduction of financial liberalization 
before prudential regulation had been instituted.  They point out that other 
countries, including China and India, which did not fully liberalize their 
financial sectors escaped the crisis, whereas countries that did (Indonesia, 
Korea, Thailand) were badly affected. In sum, it is suggested here that the Asian 
crisis was due to financial liberalization and the absence of prudential 
regulation; rather than “too much government” it was a case of too little 
government. 
 
The essential point, however, is to emphasize that each economic and financial 
crisis is of a rather different nature. One hallmark of the present crisis has been 
the credit crunch, whereby banks stopped lending to other banks and businesses, 
thereby disrupting the system of credit that oils the workings of a modern 
economy. In response, governments resorted to bailing out banks and other 
financial institutions that were deemed too big to be allowed to fail, in the sense 
that their failure would have enormous external diseconomies for other firms 
and institutions. 
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Thus, analyses of major financial crises during the past four decades are not 
directly applicable to the current crisis. Each crisis has been different from the 
one before. Every major crisis therefore needs to be examined in its own right 
with a fresh eye, before any firm analytical and policy conclusions can be drawn 
from that experience.  
 
In addition to analyzing crisis episodes it is essential to examine the role of 
macroeconomic theory as currently taught in universities and used by policy-
makers in central banks in explaining and tackling the present crisis. Neither 
academic macro-economists nor the best central bank practitioners foresaw the 
eruption of the 2008 financial crisis. The two main rival schools of thought (the 
US Keynesian and the Chicago classical) in the currently dominant 
macroeconomic theory have recently found common ground on key aspects of 
macro-economic theory. Both sides have accepted the “rational expectations” 
basis of the micro-economic theory that underlies the macro construction. In 
sum, it is assumed that households maximize utility, firms maximize profits and 
economic agents make decisions on the basis of rational expectations. These 
ideas have led to sophisticated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models 
(DSGE) that are so complex that they cannot be solved analytically. Rather, 
they require numerical methods and considerable computer power for their 
solution. Nevertheless, such models have been singularly unhelpful in 
predicting the current crisis. It is convincingly argued by Ormerod (2010) that 
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these models are based on risk calculations but do not take into account 
uncertainty. (Risk is predictable in the sense that the probability distribution of 
future outcomes can be estimated. This is not so at all for uncertainty.) Ormerod 
(2010) observes: “in the brave new world of DSGE, the possibility of a systemic 
collapse, of a cascade of defaults across the system, was never considered.” 
 
Nevertheless, when it came to devising the policy response to the crisis, key 
policy-makers gained greater wisdom from basic Keynesian economic theory 
and from economic history rather than from modern macroeconomics. US and 
European economic advisors and policy-makers drew on the former and defined 
the essential problem of the crisis in terms of a shortage of world aggregate 
demand, and referred to the economic history of the Great Depression to avoid 
the policy mistakes of that period. It is commonly believed that the failure of 
several thousand banks in the US in the 1930s contributed to the prolongation of 
the Great Depression. This explains the priority given to saving the financial 
system through unprecedented bail-outs.
10
 Similarly, the success of the giant 
economic stimulus programmes associated with the New Deal suggested that 
similar measures should be used once again to a avert a worsening recession.  
                                                 
10
 Lessons also need to be drawn from the recent history of Japan, whose average annual growth rate for the 
first decade of the 2000s fell to a mere 1 per cent. Greater research efforts devoted to understanding the 
Japanese case are likely to be more rewarding than further developing DSGE models.  
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VII. Conclusion:  The Way Forward 
 
The ongoing policy collaboration between countries provides one of the chief 
grounds for optimism. Nevertheless, there are well-founded criticisms regarding 
the legitimacy of the exclusive G20 group. Many G20 members are 
disappointed with the process because the G7 have yet to agree on meaningful 
reform of the IMF Articles of Agreement, including the weighting of voting 
power (Chin (2010) and Helleiner and Kirshner (2009). Nevertheless, the G20 
process remains a promising start to more meaningful international cooperation.  
 
It has been argued that agreement among the G20 has been entirely due to the 
recent adverse circumstances and that, once the world economy recovers, 
collective action will cease. However, on a priori grounds, an equally if not 
more plausible scenario is that the evident success of collective action will 
encourage nation states to take further coordinated action. Indeed, it can be 
argued that an international cooperation is imperative if global imbalances are 
to be corrected. 
 
Although the world economy’s growth path for the period 2000-2007 was 
ultimately unsustainable, due in part to the rising US current account deficit and 
in part to the weaknesses of the financial system, such growth certainly took the 
global economy a long way forward in various respects. The important issue 
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now is which factors will determine the outcome for the real world economy in 
the next decade or two after the crisis? Will there be a new growth path and will 
it be more or less satisfactory than the previous one, from an economic, social 
and environmental point of view? What is required is a growth path that allows 
the world economy to operate at its full sustainable potential, while reducing the 
risks of renewed global financial fragility and crisis.  
 
The central message of this contribution is that, for this to be possible, 
increasing global co-operation is essential in trade and investment and in the 
related fields of food, environment and energy. Equally importantly, a more 
equal distribution of income, wealth, and social protection, as well as returns to 
capital and labour, are needed, not only for their own sake but also to resolve 
the incipient world under-consumption problem before this becomes a serious 
obstacle to fast economic growth, and for the sake of world peace.  
 
It is, however, appropriate to ask whether the above is likely to happen? The 
most optimistic outcome is one in which the worst of the crisis is over: the 
global financial system has been thoroughly reformed and ensures stability and 
contributes to more equitable global development. At the time of writing, the 
most affected economies are recovering quite satisfactorily. Blanchard, chief 
economist of the IMF, reports that the global economy has been recovering 
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better than expected and global growth is expected to reach a rate of 4.2 
per cent in 2010 (an upwards revision) and to reach 4.3 per cent in 2011 
(Blanchard, 2010). Global trade and capital flows have been recovering much 
faster. Even unemployment, which is normally a lagging indicator, has at long 
last begun to decline albeit slowly, at least in the US (Chandra, 2010). These 
recent short-term improvements can be interpreted as suggesting that the 
evolution of the world economy is pointing in a positive direction. However, 
Blanchard warns that these “good numbers hide a more complex reality, namely 
a tepid recovery in many advanced economies, and a much stronger one in most 
emerging and developing economies.” While maybe somewhat disappointing 
for advanced economics this scenario suggests some progress greater balance in 
the world economy.  
 
One of the biggest global worries concerns the current European sovereign debt 
situation that has major implications for the world economy. One cannot 
dismiss the possibility of a cascading financial crisis due initially to contagion 
in the Euro area (starting with a default in Greece and potentially in Portugal, 
Spain and Italy, and even elsewhere in Europe) and resulting in a speculative 
attack on the Euro currency. The likelihood of such a turn of events may have a 
small probability, but in view of our limited capacity to predict the future it 
would be unwise to rule out a major crisis, particularly bearing in mind very 
recent experience. To avert such an economic, social and political catastrophe, 
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coordinated consultation and action by nations and European and global 
institutions are required to tame the financial markets.  
 
In any conflict of interest between states and the financial markets, clearly the 
interests of the former should and can prevail. In view of the dimensions of the 
European sovereign debt problem, and to avert a run on the currency, a rescue 
package of Euros 750 billion has already been put in place. If in the worst-case 
scenario this should prove inadequate, and European nations consider the 
European Union and the common currency to be vital for European peace and 
development, they could in principle act in concert and challenge the markets 
by introducing a financial package several times larger, thereby stopping 
speculators in their tracks.
11
 In this context it should be noted that the Euros 750 
billion bailout is worth 6 per cent of the GDP of the European Union. Putting 
this in a historical context, it may be recalled that just over 60 years ago the US 
administration, faced with what they perceived as a communist threat to 
Western Europe, intervened with the Marshall Plan. The value of this plan over 
a three-year period amounted to 4 per cent of US GDP (Glyn et al. 1991).
12
  
 
                                                 
11
The effectiveness of this measure was demonstrated by the Hong-Kong Central Bank’s punitive action against 
speculators during the 1997-1999 Asian crisis.  
  
12
 An even more pessimistic scenario would, as noted above, involve contagion beyond Europe and wider 
sovereign debt default. In the absence of coordinated policies and action, such a development would result in 
widespread financial chaos, economic disruption, unemployment and lower standards of living for many people 
worldwide.  
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To sum up, the current challenge to policymakers around the world is first and 
foremost to avoid long-term stagnation resulting from injudicious policies. This 
would suggest, inter alia, resisting a premature drawing down of government 
debt in rich countries. The associated reduction in state expenditure and 
increases in taxation are likely to prolong recession and unemployment, with 
consequent ripple effects that result in continued long-term stagnation 
throughout the global economy.  
 
In addition, concerted action is required to introduce national and international 
supervision and regulation of financial markets, while measures are also needed 
to achieve a rebalancing of the global economy such that it reaches its full 
potential, while also achieving an improvement in inter-country distribution of 
growth and development.  In short, markets should serve the people rather than 
determining their socio-economic destiny.
13
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
13
 It will be argued by some that reduced long-term economic growth may be positive by effecting a reduction in 
global warming and conserving natural resources. However, important issues such climate change and 
redistribution of income are beyond the scope of this short paper. 
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Table 1. Summary Table of the Causes of the Economic and Financial Crisis 
 
Trigger Unsecured loans to US home owners 
Politically welcomed, cleverly sold 
Bundled, rated and passed on 
Regulation 
Failures 
Underestimation of risks and belief in self regulation 
Overwhelmed by innovations and internationalization 
Pro cyclality were supported by rules (mark to market 
valuation, Basel 2) 
Oligopoly structure of ration agencies, incompatibilities; 
stock market listing 
Neglect of cumulative systemic risks 
Insufficient regulation of the derivative market, SPV, 
Hedge funds 
Inflated 
Expectations of 
Returns: 
Heterogeneity of profits across to countries/businesses, 
activities  
New form of equity substitutes 
Leveraging of banks, the firms an consumers 
 
Imprudent in 
incentive 
systems/risk 
management: 
Bonus for short term success, stock options 
Over leveraging and hybrid capital 
Illusion about the benefits of mergers and firm size 
(market wide oligopolies) 
Speculation as an attractive career 
Higher earnings in financial capital relative to real capital 
Risk free promises from advisors, pension funds in 
mathematical model 
Macro-economic 
imbalances: 
Savings surplus of the emerging Asian countries, oil 
producers 
Triple deficit in the USA: trade budget and savings 
Insufficient reduction in money supply after the recovery 
in 2002 
Reinvestment of rent seeking capital in the USA 
Aggravating 
factors: 
Bubbles in currency, raw material, oil and foods stuffs 
Specialized plus just-in-time relationships with 
purchasers/subcontractors 
Short-term view regarding profits, accounting rules and 
analyst’s reports 
Shortage of raw materials, energy, food stuffs 
Unequal income and wealth distribution 
Provision of loans and then selling them on (“originate to 
distribute”) 
Weakness in 
coordination 
IMF, Work bank, G7, competition policy, tax havens 
Underestimation of systemic risks 
Source: Aiginger (2009) 
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   Table 2. Current Account Balances (Selected Economies) 2000-2004 
   
 
Source: Singh, 2007. Adapted from IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2005 
Year 2000 2002 2004 2000 2002 2004 
Economies ($ Billion) (As a percentage of total 
surplus or deficit) 
Surplus 
economies 
Japan 
 
119.6 112.6 171.8 23.8 21.1 19.3 
Germany 
 
-25.7 43.1 96.4 3.9 8.4 10.0 
China 
 
20.5 35.4 70.0 4.1 6.9 7.9 
Russian 
Federation 
44.6 30.9 59.6 8.9 6.0 6.7 
Saudi Arabia 
 
14.3 11.9 49.3 2.9 2.3 5.5 
Deficit 
Economies 
United States 
 
-413.5 -473.9 -665.9 62.2 72.5 69.0 
Spain 
 
-19.4 -15.9 -49.2 2.9 2.4 5.1 
United 
Kingdom 
-36.5 -26.4 -47.0 5.5 4.0 4.9 
Australia 
 
-15.3 -16.6 -39.4 2.3 2.5 4.1 
Italy 
 
-5.8 -6.7 -24.8 0.9 1.0 2.6 
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Sources: UNCTAD, (various years); UNDESA, (May, 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
 
 
1991-
2001 
2001-
2007 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
World 3.1 3.3 1.9 2.7 4.0 3.4 3.9 3.8 
Japan 1.1 1.8 0.3 1.4 2.7 1.9 2.4 2.1 
US 3.5 2.7 1.6 2.5 3.6 3.1 2.9 2.2 
European Union  2.4 2.1 1.2 1.3 2.5 1.8 3.0 2.9 
Germany 1.8 1.2 0.0 -0.2 1.2 0.9 2.9 2.5 
United Kingdom 2.8 2.6 2.1 2.7 3.3 1.9 2.8 3.0 
Russian Federation -- 6.7 4.7 7.3 7.1 6.4 6.7 8.1 
Africa 2.9 5.2 3.7 4.9 5.4 5.7 5.6 5.8 
Latin American and 
the Caribbean 
3.1 4.0 -0.5 2.2 6.2 4.9 5.6 5.7 
East Asia 7.8 8.1 7.4 7.1 8.3 8.0 8.8 9.1 
China 10.3 10.4 9.1 10.0 10.1 10.4 11.1 11.4 
India 5.9 8.0 3.6 8.3 8.5 8.8 9.2 9.7 
Growth of World Output and that of Selected Countries 
and Regions 1991 – 2007 (% per annum) 
   38  
 
 
Table 5. Explaining the Productivity Surge in the US 
 
Average Annual 
Growth 
1973-95 1995-03 Difference 
Labour 
Productivity 
1.49 3.06 1.57 
O/w Capital 
Deepening 
0.89 1.75 0.86 
Labour Quality 0.26 0.17 -0.09 
Total Factor 
Productivity 
0.34 1.14 0.80 
 
Source: Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh, 2007. 
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